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INTRODUCTION
This is a land use case in which the plaintiffs/appellees (collectively referred to herein
as the "Bradleys"), challenge the exercise of legislative discretion by the Payson City Council
in denying two applications for rezoning of their property.
Between the filing of Payson City's initial brief in this case and the brief of Bradleys,
this Court issued its opinion in Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City. 2000 Utah Ct. App. 31,
997 P.2d 321 in which it addressed and rejected arguments which are virtually identical to
those being advanced by the Bradleys here. The Court carefully evaluated the legal issues in
Harmon City and concluded that the standard of review which is applicable to the exercise
of legislative discretion by municipal officials in making land use and zoning decisions
affords the governing body broad judicial deference and a strong presumption of validity.
Such a legislative decision should be upheld if it is fairly or reasonably debatable whether
the decision is in the interest of the general welfare of the community. Under the principles
of stare decisis^ Harmon City controls here and this Court should apply that same
deferential, reasonably debatable standard to reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to Bradleys in this case.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE "REASONABLY DEBATABLE35 STANDARD AND BROAD
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE APPLY TO THE CITY'S LEGISLATIVE
ZONING DECISION AND THE TRIAL COURTS USE OF THE
"SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE35 STANDARD IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Bradleys ignore the long-standing judicial tradition of affording municipal legislative

actions, including zoning decisions, substantial deference. They argue instead that the

appropriate review of these legislative decisions is the substantial evidence standard which
has historically been applied only to municipal administrative and quasi-judicial decisions.
In support of this standard, Bradleys argue that (1) the legislature created a ccone-size-fits-all
standard of review" for municipal land use decisions; and (2) the Supreme Court in
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d
332 contemplated applying the substantial evidence standard to legislative zoning decisions.
This Court, however, carefully and thoroughly addressed both arguments in Harmon City
and rejected them.
In Harmon City, the Court reviewed the extensive case law discussed by Payson City
in its Appellant's Brief of judicial review of land use decisions.
Judicial review of land use decisions by municipalities has always been
limited in this state to some formulation of the arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal standard. However, the deference that we have historically
granted to land use decisions under this standard has varied depending
on whether the decision-making body is acting in a legislative capacity
or an administrative/adjudicative capacity.
Harmon City at 11 8 (footnotes omitted). Analyzing this history, the Court rejected the
argument that the legislature intended to end this judicial deference to legislative land use
decisions.
We conclude that the 1991 enactment of section 10-9-1001(3), which
largely codifies the case law cited above, did not alter the deferential
review of a municipality's legislative zoning classification decisions
under the arbitrary and capricious standard.

We conclude that the Utah Legislature did not adopt a one-size-fits-all
standard of review for legislative and administrative/adjudicative
2

functions when it codified the "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal"
language of section 10-9-1001.
Id. at 111114,15 (citations omitted, emphasis added). In other words, the appropriate
standard of review of a municipal legislative zoning decision affords Payson City's denial of
Bradleys' rezoning request broad judicial deference and a strong presumption of validity.
Under that standard, a zoning decision is upheld "if it could promote the general
welfare; or even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general welfare."
Id. at 11 9, citing Marshall v. Salt Lake City. 141 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah 1943). A court may
not substitute its judgment for that of local legislators where it is at least reasonably
debatable whether the zoning decision is in the interest of the general welfare of the
community. Because the trial court crossed the line separating the judicial from the
legislative branches of government and deviated from this well-established Utah legal
precedent in granting summary judgment to Bradleys, that decision must be reversed.
Bradleys also argue that the Supreme Court in Springville Citizens gave a "clear
command" to apply the substantial evidence standard to legislative land use decisions. The
Harmon City court, however, concluded that the issues in Springville Citizens were "less
than clear" and the case should be read as consistent with the well-established case law
granting deference to legislative decisions.
We do admit that Springville Citizens can reasonably be read otherwise.
However, we conclude that, because the nature of the claim in
Springville Citizens is less than clear, we should read Springville
Citizens' application of the standard of review as consistent with
longstanding Utah common law and as supported by good public
policy, rather than as a dramatic break from prior precedent where no
such intention is expressed in the opinion.

Harmon City at 1123, n. 14 (emphasis added). After a careful analysis of Springville
Citizens, this Court concluded that neither § 10-9-1001(3) nor the Supreme Court ruling
in Springville Citizens supports the application of the substantial evidence standard to
municipal legislative zoning decisions. Harmon City at 1121.
Because the trial court relied upon the substantial evidence standard, its decision is
fundamentally flawed and its summary judgment should be reversed.
H.

THE CITY'S REJECTION OF BRADLEYS3 REZONING REQUEST
PROPERLY INVOLVED A WEIGHING OF INTERESTS AND
RESULTED IN A DECISION IN FURTHERANCE OF THE INTEREST
OF THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY.
Bradleys3 argument that the trial court properly found the City's decision to be

arbitrary and capricious because it was based solely on public clamor and lacked other
factual bases ignores several important points related to the legislative zoning process and
the evidence in the record. To begin with, this Court has determined that "the public
clamor doctrine has no application when a legislative body acts in a legislative capacity.35
Harmon City at 1127 (emphasis added).1 The Court did not indicate that the public clamor
doctrine may be a consideration under the facts of a particular case, as argued by Bradleys.
Instead, it unequivocally stated that the doctrine has no application in the legislative
decision-making process, in recognition of the inherently political and subjective nature of

1

While Bradleys feel that this conclusion "is indeed dubious," this Court had no
problem concluding that the public clamor doctrine is applicable only to the
administrative/adjudicative processes.
4

the process in making zoning decisions that deal with issues such as "compatibility" with
neighboring properties.
It is important to keep in mind that local legislators are elected to represent the
interests of an entire community. Legislating itself is a political act subject to political
considerations. See Harmon City at 11 9 n. 6 (cc[T]he legislative process is inherently
political in nature and requires a legislative body to broadly weigh the interests of all
concerned in furtherance of the general welfare.")2 It is appropriate for the legislative body
to give substantial weight to the concerns of citizens with respect to the type and direction
of the community's growth. If Bradleys do not agree with that legislative outcome, their
remedy is political in nature—elect new local legislators who agree with them—not judicial.
Bradleys argue that there is no evidence to support the conclusion that the City's
decision to reject their rezoning request was not arbitrary or capricious or that it was even
reasonably debatable. They fail to recognize and the trial court overlooked the fact that the
rezoning request was not consistent with the City's General Plan. As more fully discussed
in the City's initial brief, the Payson City General Plan encourages the adoption of an
industrial zoning designation west of 1-15 and concentrating such zoning in the natural
commercial corridor between the Union Pacific and D&RW Railroad lines and between
interstate exits numbers 254 and 252. The plan further encourages residential areas to

2

See also Daniel R. Mandelker, et al., Federal Land Use Law § 2.03[3] (1997) ("The
act of legislating necessarily entails political trading, compromise, and ad hoc decision
making which, in the aggregate, produce policies that at least approximate a fair and
equitable distribution of social resources and obligations.35 (Citation omitted.)).

locate east of that natural 1-15 buffer (R. 50, 52). While the trial court recognized this as
one of the bases for the City's denial of Bradleys3 request, it gave no weight to that fact.
The General Plan, however, represents the carefully considered legislative conclusion
of the City's governing body establishing the policies, goals and objectives for managing
future growth. This legislatively adopted plan may not be simply disregarded in evaluating
a rezoning request. Ironically, had the City approved Bradleys3 request in contravention of
the General Plan, it would have been subject to a claim for acting in an arbitrary and
capricious fashion. The legislative decision not to deviate from the City's long-term plan is
a reasonable exercise of legislative discretion with which the courts should not interfere.
Bradleys3 reliance on case law from other jurisdictions is misplaced. First, there is a
well-established line of Utah case law on these issues in support of the City's decision.
There is no need to look elsewhere. In addition, the cases referred to from other
jurisdictions, moreover, are clearly distinguishable from Utah law. Illustratively, Kanfer v.
Montgomery County Council 373 A.2d 5 (Md. App. 1977), for example, really applies a
substantial evidence standard, albeit under the guise of the ccfairly debatable" rule. Kanfer at
12. Similarly, Hall v. Korth. 244 So.2d 766, 768 (Fla.App. 1977) also required substantial
evidence in the record.
Utah law, by contrast, rejects the substantial evidence standard as applicable to
judicial review of local legislative decisions. So long as there is evidence in the record to
support the legislative action, such decisions must be affirmed under Utah law. The record
here establishes that the legislatively enacted general plan was not consistent with the

6

R-2-75 rezoning requested by Bradleys. The record also establishes legitimate public
concern that the general plan be adhered to. The legislative decision to comply with the
legislatively created general plan is reasonable as a matter of law.
It is important to keep in mind that merely because the circumstances and
information surrounding the City's decision may have also justified a contrary result or a
possible alternative conclusion, that does not render the City's decision arbitrary or
capricious or justify a request that the trial court or this Court substitute its judgment for
that of local decision makers. E.g., Smith Investment Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 25253 (Utah App. 1998) (city's choice of solutions for its problems is entirely within its
discretion); Gayland v. Salt Lake County. 358 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1961) (same). It is
also important to remember that the City's decision is afforded a statutory presumption of
validity and the burden is upon Bradleys to overcome that presumption. Their evidence to
the trial court and their arguments before this Court fail to meet that considerable threshold
burden. They must establish that there is essentially no evidence in the record to support
the City's decision. They cannot do this simply by ignoring or failing to marshal the
evidence which does, in fact, support that decision.
The City's weighing of community interests and the general welfare against Bradleys'
interests regarding the future development their property is exacdy the type of legislative
process which Utah courts have historically protected and to which the legislature has
granted considerable deference and a strong presumption of validity. The trial court
improperly reversed the City's exercise of legislative discretion by failing to recognize the

legitimate legislative policies, goals and objectives of this inherently political process and
further by substituting its judgment for that of local legislators.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO BRADLEYS AND
REVERSING THE CITY'S ZONING DECISION.
The trial court made two reversible errors. First, it applied the

administrative/adjudicative standards of Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704
(Utah App. 1988) requiring substantial evidence in support of the City's legislative
decision. There is no question, based upon the long-standing, well-developed case law
reviewed by this Court in Harmon City, that the trial court applied the incorrect standard
of review in overturning the City's zoning decision. That, alone, is a sufficient basis for
reversal.
Second, the trial court then compounded the error by substituting its judgment for
that of the local legislators in conducting what amounts to a de novo review of the rezoning
request. This substitution of judicial judgment for the exercise of local legislative discretion
is contrary to the separation of powers doctrine and at least 60 years of case law which has
found such judicial interference to be inappropriate. Under well-established Utah legal
principles, the exercise of legislative discretion in making a local zoning decision is afforded
broad judicial deference and should be reversed by the judiciary only in the rarest of
circumstances. Those circumstances do not apply to this case. The trial court therefore
improperly rejected the City's legislative judgment and its decision must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The trial court applied the incorrect standard to this statutory review of the City's
exercise of legislative discretion in making a zoning decision, thereby undermining its
summary judgment determination. Moreover, the record evidences that the City weighed
the interests of Bradleys against those of the community and chose to adhere to its
legislatively enacted General Plan. The trial court ignored that evidence and improperly
substituted its judgment for that of the City's elected legislative body. In either case, the
result was reversible error. This Court should therefore reverse the trial courfs grant of
summary judgment in favor of Bradleys and direct the trial court to enter judgment in favor
of the City.
DATED this

of June, 2000.
WILLIAMS & HUNT
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Attofakys for Defendant/Appellant
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